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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines seasheds as a method for carrying non-containenzable military cargo
on commercial containerships in the U.S. merchant marine fleet. Seasbeds are enhancement features
for containerships that convert them for the purpose of carrying military unit equipment Seasheds
were developed by the Department of Defense during the 1980s to provide carriage of outsize
military cargo for strategic deployments, and they have not been utilized for commercial
applications. They have been used in only two military employments, Display Determination '89
and Operation Desert Sortie in 1991. Performance reports indicate they successfully handled
outsized military cargo which otherwise could not be transported on unmodified containerships.
However, the lack of commercial applications hinder their usefulness outside of DOD sealift
requirements. Costs and times required to load and unload a containership under the normal
sequence of seashed activities are compared with activities required if seasheds were preboarded on
a specified containership to enhance readiness of merchant marine fleet containerships by making
them more compatible with DOD's sealift requirements. A cost-benefit analysis is performed to
assess the time and expenses that could be saved for DOD if seasheds were preboarded on
containerships. Examination of Seasheds is recommended for contingencies that require logistics-
over-the-shore (LOTS) operations. Accesion For
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1. INTRODUCTION
When the United States goes to war, it goes overseas -
and 95% of all its military cargo goes by sea. It
follows that U.S.- controlled cargo ships in adequate
number and mix are vital to our national security
interests. Additionally, it makes good sense to haul
and control a fair share of U.S. commerce in U.S.-flag,
civilian-owned and -operated merchant ships. Today's
U.S.-flag fleet does not meet the criteria for hauling
our normal imports and exports, and both government- and
civilian -owned ships fall short of meeting our
emergency military needs. (Ackley, 1992)
A. BACKGROUND
The war in the Persian Gulf demonstrated many of the
strengths and weaknesses of the nation's strategic sealift
capabilities. The United States Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM), in concert with its transportation component
commands -- Military Aiilift Command (MAC), Military Sealift
Command (MSC), and Military Traffic Management Command
(MTMC) -- moved nearly 504,000 passengers, 3.7 million tons
of dry cargo, and 6.1 million tons of petroleum products
into the area of responsibility (AOR). (Matthews and Holt,
1992)
One of the most telling weaknesses in Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, however, was the reduced size of the
U.S.-flag merchant fleet, which shrank from 3,000 vessels
after World War II to 367 in 1990. (Ackley, 1992) Many of
those 367 ships are commercially efficient containerships
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which require high-tech cargo piers or offboard cargo
handling equipment for loading and unloading. (Ackley, 1992)
Additionally, containerships are not designed to haul
outsized military cargo such as tanks, trucks, artillery,
and aircraft which cannot fit into a container.
The situation would only get worse. The Maritime
Administration (MARAD) predicted that the U.S. Merchant
fleet would continue to decline, from 168 militarily
useful dry cargo ships in 1990 to 35 by the year 2005.
(Matthews and Holt, 1992)
The 367 active U.S.-flag merchant ships will not be
around forever. Some maritime experts estimate that, unless
policies are changed, the U.S.-flag dry cargo fleet will
decrease about 85% through the year 2005, and militarily
useful tankers will decrease about 70%. The combined loss
may represent more than 200 ships. (Ackley, 1992)
During Operation Desert Shield, USTRANSCOM turned to
foreign flag ships to meet the logistics needs of the
deployment. Fortunately, the political climate was
favorable because Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was a
U.N.-sponsored action, and the U.S. did not have to declare
a national emergency, whereby control of U.S.-flag ships
would be taken by the government under the legal provisions
of the Sealift Readiness Program. Instead, foreign flag
vessel were used to lift the outsized equipment requirements
which were not met by U.S.-flag ships.
2
2. PRORLEM
Reliance on foreign flag ships to meet a military
emergency is a precarious situation which could jeopardize
the effectiveness of the nation's sealift capability and
hence national security. It is difficult to predict the
continued successful use of foreign flag vessels in the
future. For example:
Some of our allies made ships available but prohibited
them from entering the combat zone. The crew of the
Japanese freighter Sea Venus, which was loaded with
military vehicles, refused to carry its cargo to Saudi
Arabia. Similar manageable incidents occurred during
the U.S. logistic support of Israel in the 1973 war and
during the Viet Nam War. In the former case, U.S.-
chartered Liberian tankers would not deliver petroleum
products to Israel; and in the latter case, some Asian
crews in foreign-flag ships would not sail with war
supplies from Oakland to South Viet Nam. (Ackley, 1992)
Considering the reduced size and declining trend of the
U.S.-flag fleet described thus far, the strategic issue
which arises is how the U.S. can regain a strategic sealift
capability to ship outsized military cargo wherever and
whenever it is needed without dependence on allied support.
In an effort to ameliorate the sealift shortfall during
the 1980s, along with other sealift enhancement features,
the government acquired 890 seasheds, an enhancement feature
that permits containerships to carry outsized military
equipment. However, utilization of seasheds during Desert
Shield and Desert Storm was very low. They are positioned
in Bayonne, New Jersey; Charleston, South Carolina; and Port
Hueneme, California. Yet, of the 890 available, only 13
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were utilized. The specific issues that are examined in
this thesis are:
"* What are the times and resources required to set-up and
install seasheds?
"• What are the hindrances to the employment of seasheds?
"• Would there be an increase in readiness of the RRF with
seasheds preboarded on containerships in the event of a
crisis situation?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
This research is concerned with the policy issues
involving the utilization of seasheds and the consequences
of their non-utilization in exercises and war-time
contingencies. A technical analysis of various
containership capabilities is beyond the scope of this
study. However, a group of technical drawings which
illustrate the spaces which can be occupied by seasheds and
containership cargo stowage adapters (CCSAs) by modern
containerships and combination container-breakbulk ships is
provided in Appendix A.
The Army is considered the primary consumer of the
sealift of outsized equipment. Navy amphibious ships,
including the Marine Corps combat cargo, LASH, and other
ships capable of carrying outsize equipment are purposely
excluded from this thesis in anticipation of their military
mission employment during deliberate action planning or
4
crisis action planning. Employment of commercial
containerships capable of accommodating a mix of seasheds,
CCSAs, and heavy duty flatracks in anticipation of
exhausting the supply of RO/ROs, will be the primary focus
of this thesis since unit equipment carriage is essential
during mobilization.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This thesis examines containerships in which seasheds
must be carried if the ships are to be employed. It
explains deployment planning and how the employment of
seasheds could be included in the process. A significant
amount of information was obtained from personal interviews
with individuals assigned to transportation commands,
government transportation agencies, and private industry.
The primary methodologies employed included the following:
"* Interviews with officials from Military Sealift Command
(MSC), U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM),
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and
Maritime Administration (MARAD)
"• Interviews with consultants, McCaffery and Whitner Inc.,
a recent provider of cost estimates for containership
conversions for seashed installation.
"* Review of published and unpublished articles on seasheds
and containerships.
"* A model of activities required to employ seasheds is
designed and simulated for analysis of the costs and
times required for seashed employment.
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In addition, a time-versus-cost tradeoff analysis is
conducted using the critical path method and project
crashing techniques which are decision support technologies
designed to aid in accurate cost and time estimates for
unique projects. Project crashing is used to project cost
alternatives.
Actual cost data from after action reports from Display
Determination '89, performance data from Operation Desert
Sortie, as well as financial data provided by Military
Sealift Command, was used to the greatest extent possible;
however, some assumptions and estimations were necessary to
formulate the model. This research should be considered
useful for providing a method of analyzing seashed
employment cost and time tradeoffs for future studies.
R. THESIS CONTENTS
Chapter II next provides an overview of sealift
requirements and the sealift mix alternatives available.
Chapter III covers the background of containerization and
the military usefulness of containerships with and without
seasheds. It also addresses the advantages and
disadvantages of seashed to government and industry.
Chapter IV presents seashed employment information such
as deployment planning factors, transportation feasibility,
seashed availability, and the types of military units that
could employ seasheds for their deployment.
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This information and other data is analyzed in Chapter
V. A model is formulated which simulates some of the data
to generate cost and time estimates. These estimates are
used to compare normal operations with the use of preboarded
seasheds on a containership. The summary and conclusions
are presented in Chapter VI. It also includes
recommendations for further research.
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XI. ShILIFT RZQUXRZX38TS
The purpose of this chapter is to examine military
sealift requirements as viewed by government agencies, such
as the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
and, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) of the United
States Department of Transportation, which employ the
sealift assets provided from the U.S.-flag fleet and
government owned sealift assets. It discusses the sealift
mix alternatives and considers policies which could minimize
the risks of a shortfall in sealift capability.
Although certain military mission requirements will
still dictate the development and acquisition of
specialized transportation assets not found in the
commercial market, the majority of transportation assets
can be expected to be available from the commercial
sector. It is recognized however, that a successful
military cargo system that employs intermodal systems is
dependent upon an actively functioning U.S. Flag
merchant fleet that can be readily available to perform
sealift missions. The greater the compatibility of
equipment of the U.S. Flag fleet with DOD's sealift
requirements, the greater can be the reduction in costs
associated with the development, acquisition and
stockpiling of specialized Government-owned assets.
(MARAD Report No. MA-RD-840-90015, 1990)
A. THE SIALIFT MIX
A clear-cut lift requirement level has not been
established since the radical changes in Eastern Europe,
including the reunification of Germany and the
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disintegration of the Soviet Union. America is the sole
superpower in the world and has an unprecedented leadership
role in world affairs. Unilateral military action on a
large scale is not a likely contingency because the U.S.
continues to be influential within the United Nations.
However, a leadership role in military or humanitarian
actions such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia may help
shape future sealift requirements.
Historically, sealift has provided 90-95% of the overall
lift requirements for major combat expeditionary operations.
Although the Persian Gulf War was consistent with this
proportion, the inability of the U.S. flagged fleet to meet
the surge requirement in the initial phase without the
assistance of foreign flagged vessels has identified a
shortfall in sealift capability.
The war in the Persian Gulf heightened USTRANSCOM's
concerns for the health of the nation's maritime
industry. At the end of World War II, there were
thousands of US-flagged Merchant Marine ships carrying
over 50% of US foreign ocean-going trade. By 1970, the
number of ships in the US Merchant Marine had dropped to
894 with a corresponding decrease in the amount of US
trade they carried. The United States, the largest
trading nation in the world, carried in 1990 less than
four percent of its trade on US-flagged ships.
(.,atthews and Holt, 1992)
A recent study conducted by MARAD, initiated to address
alternatives to stockpiling government-owned National
Defense Features (NDFs) and Sealift Enhancement Features
(SEFs) cited that the military sealift capacity of our U.S.-
flag fleet is declining yearly. It further stated that the
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versatile, militarily useful breakbulk ship is fast fading
from the fleet and is being replaced by the large
specialized non-self-sustaining containership which reduces
the flexibility needed to meet traditional military sealift
requirements. (MARAD Report No. MA-RD-840-90015, 1990) The
exact cause and effect relationship of containerized
shipping and the decline in militarily useful breakbulk
shipping is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the
issue that is presented by its decline is whether DOD should
consider employing enhancements of U.S.-flag containerships
which remain available by using seasheds or if DOD should
continue to utilize foreign shipping to carry its unit
equipment as a money saving measure.
The ships considered militarily useful include, among
others, those dry cargo vessels considered most useful for
military mobilization. They are not confined to U.S.
flagged fleet assets, but are drawn from ships fitting any
of the following criteria:
"* An ocean-going dry cargo vessel over 6,000 Dead Weight
Tons (DWT).
"• A coated tank.r between 6,000 and 80,000 DWT.
"• An integrated tug-barge unit.
"• A dry cargo ship with special military capability.
"• A National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) or Ready Reserve
Fleet (RRF) vessel retained for national defense
purposes.
"• A NATO dry cargo vessel.
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* U.S. and effective U.S.- controlled passenger ships
(EUSC).
* A vessel meeting the above criteria in the EUSC.
Ships that are not militarily useful include dry bulk or
ore ships, LNG/LPG, special product tankers, refrigerator
ships, ferries, harbor tugs, tankers over 80,000 DWT, any
size uncoated tanker, and Great Lakes operators. (Sweeney,
1984)
D. ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF (RO/RO) VESSZLS
Military Sealift Command relies heavily on commercial
transportation to meet sealift requirements. RO/RO vessels
have been the most militarily useful. In the late 1960s,
commercial fleets began using containerships. As a result,
ships capable of handling military unit equipment, such as
breakbulk and RO/RO, became commercially unprofitable (MSC
Annual Report, 1990). The trend toward containerships was
accompanied by a significant shrinkage of the U.S. maritime
industry. In fact, with the sole exception of containerized
liner shipping, in which U.S. operat.ors have been able to
maintain a respectable share of U.S. trade, U.S. shipping in
general carries a negligible proportion of U.S. foreign
trade. (Frankel, 1986)
MARAD has purchased 12 RO/ROs for the RRF in June, 1993,
bringing the total RRF to 109 ships. The average age of the
purchased vessels is 13 years, and their procurement cost
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was $266.2 Million. Three of them were already U.S.
flagged, and the others were foreign flagged vessels before
their purchase. (Corkrey interview, 1993) With DOD's budget
dwindling each year and an identifiable shortfall of sealift
capability, the Navy is looking more closely at the
containership as an alternative shipping method in the
sealift mix.
According to Stopford, container movements worldwide
increased from 17.4 million twenty-foot equivalent units
(TEU) in 1975 to 55 million TEU in 1985, a threefold
expansion in ten years. These figures cover total container
movements through ports, including empties. They also cover
feeder and local services. (Stopford, 1990) Because they
are competitive internationally, the number of U.S. flagged
containerships is not eroding as rapidly as breakbulks and
RO/ROs.
If U.S. defense planning includes military intervention
without allied support, then more compatibility with the
commercial shipping industry will increase DOD's ability to
lift large scale requirements in the timeframes required.
The upward trend of containers and downward trend of
militarily useful vessels places the U.S. commercial
shipping industry and DOD shipping requirements on divergent
paths. This is largely due to the incompatibility of
containerships with outsized bulky unit equipment such as
tanks, trucks, bulldozers, and helicopters. Military
12
strategists voiced concern about the lack of surge sealift
capability and convinced Congress to approve a major sealift
enhancement program in the 1980s. The cost for the program
was over $7 billion. The Navy acquired eight fast sealift
ships; 13 Maritime Preposition Ships configured to support
three Marine Expeditionary Brigades; 11 other afloat
prepositioning ships to carry chiefly U.S. Army and Air
Force equipment; two hospital ships; two aviation logistics
support ships; and 96 ships for the Ready Reserve Force.
(MSC Annual Report, 1991) As Figure 1 indicates, 77
militarily useful ships are controlled by MSC as of March of
1993.
C. THE RISK OF SHORTFALLS IN SRALIFT CAPABILITY
During the 1980s the major focus of military strategy
was aimed at potential conflicts between superpowers, and
contingencies were planned for larger threats than Iraq.
Given the seapower that the former Soviet Union wielded, its
capability to strategically disrupt sea lanes of
communications (SLOCs), and its larger force structure
compared with Iraq's, it follows that those military plans
would almost certainly leave more than sufficient capacity
for sealift on a smaller scale, sufficient to handle a
threat of Iraq equivalent size in the Persian Gulf.
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shortages of specific types of transportation assets
throughout any major response to mobilization, deployment,
or crisis; every contingency cannot be planned for. Some
contingencies will be dismissed by planners as being
realistic but not probable and, upon their occurrence, will
wind up evolving into a crisis situation. For example,
after Operation Desert Storm the scarcity of RO/RO and
combination RO/RO-container vessels was readily identified
as a problem that must be addressed by DOD. In that crisis
situation, the contingency of deploying to the Persian Gulf
resulted in a RO/RO shortfall partially as a result of
dismissing the contingency as realistic but improbable.
After identifying the sealift shortfalls from Desert
Shield, General Hansford Johnson, the Commander-in-Chief of
U.S. Transportation Command, testified before the House
Armed Services Subcommittee on the needed sealift reforms.
He stated that the military needs the following improvements
in strategic sealift to guarantee necessary power projection
capabilities:
"* Build eight to 10 new Strategic Sealift Ships (SSS).
These ships would serve the same role as the FSSs, but
would incorporate the diesel propulsion system and would
travel at only 25 knots.
"- Purchase 20 more modern RO/RO ships on the open market.
These ships would be added to the Ready Reserve Force
(RRF), and replace a comparable number of breakbulk
ships.
"* Purchase an unnamed number of Afloat Prepositioning
Ships.
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* Improve the readiness and maintenance level of the RRF
(Sowers, 1991)
An alterative view of this testimony stated that not
only is this request tremendously expensive, but empirical
evidence also strongly suggests that strategic mobility
policy makers may have incorrectly interpreted the lessons
to be gained from the government's dependence on foreign-
flagged ships during the war with Iraq. A different
perspective might indicate that the U.S. had not exhausted
all its available sealift assets. Rather than buying more
military-owned ships, perhaps the U.S. could meet its
sealift requirement without foreign assistance if it used
the largely untapped sealift source of the U.S. merchant
containership fleet.
Foreign ships transported approximately 15% of the cargo
tonnage during Desert Shield. (Sowers, 1991) One question
that this fact raises is: Since the U.S. transported 85% of
the cargo, can containerships make up the shortfall that
foreign-flag ships were asked to carry? The answer is yes
when the seashed and flatrack enhancements are considered.
However, the cost could be higher than foreign charters.
Fiscal constraints, requiring judicious cost effective
decisions in the current operating budgets, cause military
officials to view seashed sealift enhancement features
(SEFs) as a last ditch measure because of expected high
costs and large differences in estimated costs associated
16
with their use. This thesis provides a cost estimation
procedure that should dramatically reduce the cost estimate
differences, and a decision support model that makes the
estimated cost and loading time more accurate.
The next chapter discusses the background of
containerships in which seasheds and flatracks can be
employed. It examines their military usefulness and
compares their employment in military operations with
commercial operations.
17
111. CONTAINIRSHIPS, SZASHZDS, AND FLATRACKS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background
information on the commercial industry's development of
containerized shipping and the Department of Defense's
utilization of containers in shipping. It contains
information on significant issues impacting DOD's use of
containerization, and is focused on the evolving issues
which have impacted the structure of the maritime industry
and its capability to provide strategic sealift for DOD. A
specific assessment of the industry's free market mechanisms
compared with DOD's alternatives for attaining sustainable
sealift capabilities is presented in this chapter. Special
emphasis is given to the impact that outsized equipment has
on sealift capabilities, because it is the equipment that
seasheds and flatracks were designed to carry.
A. BACKGROUND
At sea, container tankers were introduced in the New
York to Houston trade in 1956, and in 1958 the
California to Hawaii trade was containerized. The first
deep sea container service was started on the North
Atlantic in early 1966 by Sea-Land, a company set up by
Malcolm MacLean, who was a trucker rather than a
shipowner. His experience with the trucking industry
had convinced him of the merit of a cargo handling
system that could use all three transport modes - road,
rail and sea. The major European liner shipping
companies had by this time also made the decision to set
up their own container services. This involved a major
18
investment in completely new ships, shore-based handling
facilities and of course containers themselves.
(Stopford, 1990)
The coastal shipping business had been in a steady
decline after World War II because breakbulk service could
not compete against trucks and railroads. (Muller, 1989)
But, by using the trucking concepts of containerized
transport, MacLean was able to develop a comparative
advantage for waterborne trade.
He experimented without interference from foreign
shipping lines because he was dealing with intra-U.S.
(and territorial) traffic. After perfecting his system
and methods on domestic service, MacLean invaded the
international field. (Muller, 1989)
As the economic resources to supply different sizes of
containers and intermodal systems became scarce, a
requirement of the deep sea trade arose that all countries
should use the same standard containers. To meet this
requirement, the International Standard Organization (ISO)
devised a standard set of external container dimensions,
initially offering a box 8 feet high and 8 feet wide, with
four optional lengths, 10 foot, 20 foot, 30 foot, and 40
foot.
In practice, the 20-foot container became established as
the primary mode of international container business. Out of
the total container stock of 4.8 million TEU (twenty-foot
equivalent units) in 1986, about two thirds were 20-foot
units and the remaining third were mainly 40-foot units.
(Stopford, 1990)
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The impact of the container revolution on the maritime
industry is not straightforward and simple to trace through
direct competition among independent competitors. It has
been affected by governments and shipowner conferences as
well as shipper associations.
The overwhelming efficiency of containership operation
forced many shiplines to convert to this more efficient
system, move on to other trade routes, or perish,
despite the helping hand of government regulation and
subsidy or conference protection. (Muller, 1989)
The number of ships in the U.S. flagged fleet has
dramatically decreased since containerization has developed
into its role as the predominant method for shipping cargo
in the world shipping market. The causes and effects of the
decline in the U. S. Merchant Fleet are beyond the scope of
this thesis, but it is worth noting that the military
usefulness of this fleet is a topic which is relevant to
this thesis and is discussed further in this chapter.
1. Commercial Advantages of Containerization
The history behind containerization makes the
advantages easy to identify and makes the decisions for the
shipper who is familiar with containerization relatively
simple. They are traceable to several economic advantages
that containerization supplies the shipper, the carrier or
both parties. The following list contains only a few of the
major advantages of containerization.
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1) Containerization permits door-to-door service without
intermediate handling of the contents at transshipment
points, because they can be transferred between ships
trucks, aircraft, and trains.
2) Less congestion at ports.
3) Reduced risk of loss or damage to cargo.
4) Mechanization of cargo handling reduces labor cost.
5) Containerization has permitted fleet reduction. On the
average one containership has displaced six smaller and
slower breakbulk ships. (Not necessarily an advantage to
the military shipper; each ship sunk by the enemy would
mean a larger cargo loss.)
6) Intermodalism improves the customer service benefits to
the customer by offering:
"* A single bill of lading;
"• A through rate that covers both maritime and surface
transportation costs;
"* Greater reliability of delivery over loose shipments;
and
"* In-transit visibility (electronic tracking is
easier to employ). (Sowers, 1991)
2. Disadvantages of Commercial Containerization
The list of disadvantages is also long but it is
greatly overshadowed by the commercial advantages; the major
disadvantages relevant to this thesis are listed below.
" Containerization is capital intensive. The required
investments range from large inventories of containers,
containerships, container handling equipment, chassis,
and large developed terminals, to automated inventory
systems.
"* Outsize equipment is not containerizable. While various
specialized containers are designed to handle outsized
material, bulk, and liquid, these types of containers
are not always available.
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Some trade routes are imbalanced with more imports than
exports. This means empty containers must be
transported back to the origin without profitable trade
goods. (Sowers, 1991)
3. Initial Military Uses for Containers
The first documented use of containers by the
military was with the Army Transportation Corps during the
Korean War:
The principal reason was to afford protection to
valuable material, which was subject not only to
environmental damage but also to pilferage. This
initial use of the container for military purposes led
to the subsequent development of the CONEX (container
express) in 1953. The introduction of CONEX was the
first large-scale effort by the DOD to incorporate the
container concept into the military transportation
system.... As the benefits of containerization were
embraced by commercial liner firms, use of containers in
ocean transportation multiplied. The Vietnam conflict
stimulated DOD's interest in the use and the importance
of containerization. When the limited benefits of the
CONEX container proved inadequate to handle the volume
of material required, a concerted effort was made by
DOD, to introduce commercial container service. During
this period most of the containerizable dry cargo, aside
from ammunition, was converted to container service.
(Sweeney, 1984)
By the end of the Vietnam conflict, containerization had
developed into an industry standard for commercial shipping
and the vessels that replaced the older breakbulk vessels
were containerships capable of carrying containers stacked
in cells within the ship and on deck.
4. DOD Containerization Policy
The Department of Defense has defined objectives, as
stated in DOD Directive 4500.37 of 2 April 1987 "Management
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of the DOD Intermodal Container System," to establish a
container oriented distribution system capable of meeting
potential mobilization and deployment goals. The objective
was aimed at establishing containerized shipments as the
preferred method of movement of military vehicles,
equipment, and supplies unless cost effectiveness or
peculiar shipping requirements are overriding factors.
The objectives are not limited to container control
issues such as their development, purchase, or lease. The
purpose of the DOD containerization objective is to enable
the attainment of mobilization and deployment objectives by
employing transportation industry assets supplemented by DOD
assets.
The directive does not make policy in which systems
are recommended for procurement for the mobilization and
deployment requirements but rather recommends cooperative
effort of the military services and the commercial
transportation industry. DOD's preference is to use the
commercial industry's common intermodal equipment such as
freight containers, flatracks/platform containers, terminal
equipment and line-haul equipment. In order to utilize the
commercial transpcrtation infrastructure, DOD-furnished
equipment should be intermodal equipment that fulfills each
service's unique requirements.
While speaking on the topic of containerization
during a seminar on MSC's operational roles in strategic
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sealift, Marine Lt. Colonel Dan Dykstra of MSC Headquarters
Plans Division (N52) pointed out:
We should rely on the commercial sector as much as we
can before we attempt to set up a system for ourselves
when they already have a system that works. (Dykstra
interview, June 1993)
Such a policy would support the objectives of DOD
containerization in promoting government and private sector
cooperation whenever possible. However, when the commercial
sector cannot commit its assets to provide for unspecified
contingency requirements, the Government is exposed to a
risk of a shortfall in strategic sealift assets.
The inventory of militarily useful U.S. flag ships,
as of March 1993 and as tabulated by MSC, is presented in
Figure 2. Of the 260 ships considered militarily useful by















----- - 6 carcarriers
Figure 2 Source: Military Sealift Command
Headquarters Code (N52) Plans Division
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B. COITAhINZSH IPS AND XNT3IBODALIM
From the early development of containerships, multiple
types of ships were built with different capabilities which
may be classified into two general categories: self-
sustaining containerships (SSCs) and non-self-sustaining
containerships (NSSCs). The SSC can load and unload its
cargo with its gantry crane or integral lifting equipment.
The NSSC is not equipped with lifting equipment and must
depend on external cranes to load and unload its cargo.
Supporting both of these ship designs requires flexibility,
because although they both carry containerized cargo, their
cargo handling requirements for loading and unloading at a
port are different. Hence, the major port services that
each ship type receives are different.
As trade routes were developed to take advantage of the
newer containerships, major ports were redesigned into
elaborate containerports with giant container cranes;
thus there was no need to incur additional expense by
constructing self-sustaining containerships... This
progressed to the point that all of the containerships
now under construction in the United States are non-
self-sustaining. The trend has also been toward larger
and faster vessels in order to further increase the
advantage of service and volume. (Sweeney, 1984)
The development of major ports with mechanized cargo
handling capabilities led the commercial container handling
companies to construct intermodal freight routes which
expanded to cover land, sea, and air routes.
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Intermodalism and containerization are advantageous to
shippers and carriers in several ways:
"* Reduced congestion in the port by mechanized cargo
handling.
"* Reduced cargo handling costs because cargo is handled
fewer times between origin and destination.
"* Less cost for idle time for shipowners and delayed
service to shippers.
"* Less labor cost shoreside to load and discharge a
containership compared with a breakbulk ship.
"* Door-to-door transportation service provided by
utilizing more than one mode of transportation. A
container may be transported by any combination of
truck, rail, sea, and sometimes air.
C. XILXTARY USZFULNMSS OF CONTAINERSHIPS
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) of the U.S.
Department of Transportation has identified features that
can enhance a commercial ship's military capability.
National Defense Features (NDFs) or Sealift Enhancement
Features (SEFs) basically fall into three categories:
productivity enhancements, survivability enhancements, and
operational enhancements. Table 1 is an initial list of the
potential ship enhancement features described by MARAD.
Each enhancement, as evaluated by MARAD, is matched with
commercial ship types based on its military mission
enhancing capability.
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Table 1: INITIAL LIST OF POTENTIAL SHIP ENHANCEMENTS





D. Lighter Stowage Ancillaries
(Weather Deck Fittings)
E. Crane Enhanced Containership
F. Containership Strike-up System
G. Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) Deck
H. Vehicle Tiedown System
I. Troopship Configuration
J. UNREP Consolidation System
(Dry Cargo/Ammunition)
K. Modular Cargo Delivery Station
L. Side Loadable Ancillary
(Rails for Side Loadable Causeway Sections)
M. Alongside Lighter Mooring
N. UNREP Consolidation (POL)
0. Astern Refueling Rig
P. Modular Fuel Delivery Station
Q. RO/RO 'Tween Deck
R. LASH Lift Beam
S. Tank Top Support Structure
SURVIVABILITY ZNHANCEM3NTS
A. Damage Control Equipment Upgrade
B. Compartment Subdivision
C. Exclusion of Gray Cast Iron
D. Positive Ventilation
E. Chaff Launcher
F. Closed Loop Fire Main
G. Fire Suppression System
H. NBC Washdown
OPERATIONAL ZNHANCEMZNTS
A. Communications Upgrade (Nonsecure)




F. Coated Tanks and Pipes (JP-5 Capability)
G. Additional Berthing
H. Water Distiller Upgrade
I. Bow Thruster
J. Pumping Rate Upgrade (Cargo Oil)
28
Four mission areas are used to evaluate whether a
commercial ship is militarily useful with the enhancements
included:
"* Combat Logistics Force (CLF) Resupply;
"* Replenishment of Combatants;
"• Reinforcement and Sustainment; and
"• Assault Follow-on Echelon (AFOE) Resupply.
The assessment of the enhancements are judged to be
mission essential, preferable, insensitive, or not
applicable. Each enhancement is also assessed from a
commercial viewpoint. The commercial viability of the
productivity features offer the greatest compatibility with
military applications. A few of the survivability and
operational enhancements offer potential for military
usefulness. After it has been assessed, an enhancement can
be deemed desirable, undesirable, or insensitive and
prioritized from both the military and the commercial
viewpoint. (MARAD Report No. MA-RD-840-90015, 1990)
1. Productivity Enhancemunts
Commercial containerships have the capability to
carry large quantities of containerizable cargo at
relatively high rates of speed with a capability of rapid
onload and offload in port operations. Pure containerships
do not, however, have the flexibility of accommodating
29
outsize cargo as do breakbulk ships, or the versatility of
combination container RO/ROs or straight RO/RO ships. The
containership can, however, be enhanced to fit the
dimensions of outsize cargo by installing Sealift
Enhancement Features (SEF) such as seashed or flatracks.
Because of the shortage of RO/RO, barge and
breakbulk ships, in a major contingency, containerships must
have the capability to carry surge cargo, i.e, initial
combat equipment. Depending on the military unit, only
about a quarter of the Army unit equipment, because of its
size, can be carried in standard commercial containers.
Through seashed and flatrack programs, the Navy can
provide the capability to carry large military vehicles and
outsize cargo that cannot be containerized. A flatrack
provides a means of carrying outsized cargo and may be used
with or without containers or seasheds. Figure 3 illustrates
a flatrack. Its steel frame, wooden floor and steel or
wooden bottom support, and open sides are designed to fit
inside the vertical cell guides of a containership.
Seasheds provide temporary decks in containerships
for transport of large military vehicles and outsize
military cargo that will not fit into containers. Figure 4
illustrates a seashed as it would be used in a containership
hold. Each seashed is a structure (40'L x 24'W x 12.5'H)
which fits into the cells of a containership and occupies
the space of four and one-half containers (3 across and 1.5
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Figure 3 Flatracks
high). The ship's load-bearing container cell guides must
be reinforced before seasheds can be installed.
Seasheds supplemented by flatracks enhance the
military utility of commercial containerships by enabling
them to transport a vast amount of Army and Marine Corps
unit equipment which they otherwise could not have carried.
Unlike flatracks, seasheds do not require handling during
offloading operations and they are retained aboard as long
as the containership is needed to carry vehicles and other
outsize cargo. However, seasheds may be removed, permitting




Sea Shads Suacked In Cornamisehip Hold
Figure 4 Seashed
Seasheds can be used for outsize cargo when there is
a shortfall of RO/RO vessels. The Navy flatrack is portable
and can be used individually or placed side by side with
seasheds or containers in the containership's holds.
Since seasheds and heavy duty flatracks do not
provide the capability of door-to-door service and are not
utilized by more than one mode of transportation, they are
not considered truly intermodal items of equipment.
However, DOD includes them as items of ancillary equipment
which can be used to enhance the productivity for
mobilization missions of intermodal containerships and
combination container-RO/RO ships.
32
Table 2 includes an index at the bottom which is
helpful in explaining the meaning of the numbers and dashes
assigned by MARAD in the matrix of the enhancements for the
merchant ships in each category. The evaluation numbers
most relevant to this thesis appear in the columns for
containerships and combination container/breakbulk (COMBO).
For example, flatracks are evaluated as mission essential
for all of the mission categories considered by MARAD.
Seasheds are evaluated as mission essential for point-to-
point reinforce6.-ent and sustainment military operations and
for Assault Follow-on Echelon support, but they are
considered only preferable for use during combat logistics
force (CLF) resupply and replenishment of combatant ships.
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TABLE 2: NHANCEHMANT FOR MOBILIZATION MISSIONS -
PRODUCTIVITY 1/
Merchant Ship Type
Container Tanker RO/RO Combo Break-
Enhancement I I I ] Bulk
Mission Category !/
ABCD ABCD ABCD ABCD ABCD
A. Flatrack 1111 --- 1
B. Seashed 2211 ---- ---- 2211
'/ Selection Criteria: 1 = Mission Essential; 2 =
Preferable; 3 = Insensitive; - Enhancement does not
apply.
2/ Mission Category: A = CLF Resupply; B = Replenishment
of Combatants; C = Point-to-Point (Reinforce/ Sustain
Military Operations); and D = AFOE support.
/ This requirement probably applies to a small quantity
of vessels in the total fleet.
Source: MARAD Report No. MA-RD-840-90015, 1990
2. Government's Advantages with Seasheds and Flatracks
There are major advantages to the government in
having seasheds and flatracks in the custody of commercial
carriers, as pointed out by the MARAD report on alternatives
to stockpiling national defense features (NDFs) (MARAD
Report No. MA-RD-840-90015, 1990). The most significant
advantage is that during times of national contingencies,
U.S. Flag vessels will be able to respond rapidly to sealift
needs of the military. Furthermore, if these seasheds were
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already installed, no time would be lost by diverting a
containership from the deploying unit's Port of Embarkation
(POE) to a congested port where this NDF equipment is
stored.
The containership with the seashed and flatrack
NDF enhancements on board could arrive at its POE ready to
load outsized cargo without delays for modifications and
installations. These advantages provide significant
reductions in loading time and will be discussed in greater
detail in Chapter IV. However, numerous hindrances to using
seasheds have prevented their usage to such an extent that
reliable cost estimates cannot be established, and the
benefits provided by reducing loading times are not clearly
worth any added costs.
3. Maritime Industry Viewpoint on Seasheds and
Flatracks
In Table 2, the enhancement features for
productivity were displayed with respect to each ship type
and evaluated for military usefulness in the missions of
each ship. Flatracks were assessed as mission essential in
containerships and combination container/breakbulk ships for
in every mission category. Seasheds were assessed as
preferable in resupply of CLF and in replenishment of
combatants and mission essential when employed in point-to-
point reinforcement/sustainment military operations or
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assault follow-on echelon support (AFOE). Table 3 compares
the productivity enhancements from the viewpoint of carriers
who may want to charter their ships with the DOD.
Table 3: UNHANCIZMNT COMPARXSON FROM KARIT N1 INDUSTRY
VXZWPOzN? I/
Enhancement Merchant Ship Type
Productivity Container Tanker RO/RO Combo Break-
_rodutivity _Bulk
A. Flatracl 1 1
B. Seashed 1 1
V/ Selection Criteria: 1 = Desirable; 2 = Insensitive; 3
= Undesirable; and blank = not applicable to ship type.
Source: MARAD Report No. MA-RD-840-90015, 1990
The most prominent advantages for seasheds are:
"* Seasheds enable the temporary conversion of a ship to be
made without degrading the capability of the ship to
perform its normal peacetime commercial functions.
"• When DOD shippers need more unit equipment shipped to
meet a required due date (RDD), conversions to seashed-
installed ships increase the carriers' total space
available for unit equipment.
"* Work-through floors on seasheds allow them to remain in
place during discharge.
"* Seashed conversions do not require removal after a load
has been delivered to the point of debarkation. This
allows the seashed to return for subsequent cargo
loading without further modification. Once a mission is
completed, seasheds may remain installed or can be
removed to restore the containership's original
configuration.
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When chartering for DOD the advantage that seasheds
and flatracks would provide to commercial containership
owners is the increased flexibility of cargoes the ship can
carry for a small investment. (MARAD Report No. MA-RD-840-
90015, 1990) The potential business the carrier can
generate or maintain would generally dictate the number of
seasheds it should carry on a ship-by-ship basis, which may
range from zero up to the number cited in Appendix B.
4. Disadvantages of Using Seasheds and/or Flatracks
Containerships are not commercially viable unless
they are making a profit. Methods of moving outsized
equipment on containerships need to involve:
"• Minimum cost for cargo handling;
"* Minimum interference with expected revenues; and
"• A profit for the carrier.
Combination container-breakbulk ships are generally
impractical in the US liner trades market because the
container customers are delayed by the slower breakbulk
loading and discharge procedures, which also affects ship
productivity. (Niven,1987) Operationally, a seashed
equipped containership can be quite similar to a combination
container-breakbulk ship. However, Niven's observations are
not applicable in this context because in chartering with
government, the owner has moved the containership from the
liner trade to the charter market. As with most chartered
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ships, there is only one shipper and hence no problem with
one shipper being delayed by another. Also, the owner is
paid by the day and is therefore not adversely affected by
longer loading times. In this case, the entire ship is
available for DOD unit equipment cargo, both oversized and
containerized.
Traditionally, the government has avoided competing
with industry. MARAD predicts that if seasheds and
flatracks were made available to the commercial sector it
could impact commercial shipping in two ways that may be
harmful:
"* Commercial equipment lessors could lose business due to
government-provided seasheds and flatracks replacing
equipment normally used from their inventory.
"* If containerships carried more breakbulk cargo with
seasheds and flatracks, the breakbulk shipping market
could shrink further. (MARAD Report No. MA-RD-840-
90015, 1990)
With these issues in mind, MARAD and MSC have
outlined a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) setting forth
conditions and requirements associated with commercial uses
of stockpiled NDFs such as seasheds and flatracks. There
has been no agreement signed at this time, but a possible
aspect of the government's cooperative program could be
implemented in the form of a government lease program.
To reduce paperwork the lease program could be
structured as a long-term agreement with equipment returned
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only as needed. The lease price may be reduced below market
price to equipment providers in order to avoid direct
competition with them and provide incentives to get NDFs
into the commercial carrier. According to Mr. Dave Nava,
Military Sealift Command Code (N9), it is possible that the
government would lease the seasheds for one dollar to the
carriers and make arrangements for their installation on a
not-to-interfere basis to coincide with the vessels'
periodic maintenance and overhaul schedules. (Nava
Interview, 1993) The government would also save on its
maintenance and storage costs once the seasheds were
installed on commercial vessels.
The next chapter discusses seashed and flatrack
employment during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In
Chapter V, economic anal-ysis is used to illuminate the
impact of cost effective decisions regarding the employment
of seasheds for handling unit equipment.
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ZV. 8lA•SHD MPLOYMINT DATA
This chapter describes the way that strategic assets
such as seasheds and flatracks are considered for
deployments. Deliberate planning and crisis planning
processes are discussed first in this chapter in order to
explain the important processes in which seasheds must be
included if they are going to be used by military planners.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of actual
mobilization of forces, theater deployment, and employment
of seasheds and flatracks in the South West Asian theater of
operation.
A. DEPLOYMINT PLANNING FACTORS
As a result of DOD's deliberate planning process,
numerous high level computerized programs and Operation
Plans (OPLANs) exist. However, actual decisions thus far
have been based on specific plans tailored by consensus of
military comnmanders involved in supplying the required
equipment to the theater commanders without regard for a
pre-planned computerized system.
Typically, strategic deployments are based on Operation
Plans and their accompanying Time Phased Force
Deployment Data (TPFDD or OTip-Fidu), which are
developed and executed using the Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The TPFDD
identifies the scheme of deployment, including the
sequence in which specific units deploy, their ports of
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embarkation, and estimates of transportation
requirements. At the outset of Desert Shield, however,
the Commander in Chief, United States Central Command
(USCINCCENT) did not have a TPFDD. (In fact, since 1989
there had been only one TPFDD refinement conference and
that was for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific
Command.) All that was available for USCINCCENT's area
of responsibility (AOR) was a Concept Outline Plan and
draft Operation Plan for the United States Central
Command's (USCENTCOM's) AOR, prepared by USCENTCOM with
the assistance of USTRANSCOM and other supporting
commands in the spring and summer of 1990. Essentially,
USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, the Services, and the Joint Staff
planned the initial phases of the deployment manually
through direct conversations while constructing an
execution TPFDD. (Matthews and Holt, 1992)
1. The Importance of Deployment Planning
In order to avoid chaos and reduce confusion when
units are deploying, military deployment planners must keep
refined deployment data. Once the United States
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) loaded JOPES with a
refined TPFDD, it proved crucial to Desert Shield/Desert
Storm deployment order and discipline. As a result, General
Hansford Johnson, Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM,
recommended that DOD maintain funding for incremental JOPES
software for use in peace as well as war. "Train, train,
train, use, use, use" was the "real key to success with
JOPES" according to General Johnson. (Matthews and Holt,
1992) It is unclear whether seasheds are included in the
latest revision of JOPES, but the phrase could apply to
seasheds' use as well. If seasheds were included for use
41
while training, there is a strong chance that they would be
used effectively during a crisis situation.
Figure 5 shows that in order to produce a refined
TPFDD for an OPLAN, military commanders must identify the
movement requirements, describe them in logistic terms that
are commonly accepted, and determine the movement criteria
for the type of cargo. It is acceptable to refer to outsize
cargo in cubic feet, measurement tons (MTONs), or square
feet. The preferred measurement of outsize cargo in
USTRANSCOM is square feet and this thesis will use its
measurement in square feet as well.
The Strategic Transportation Problem
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The first time a non-self-sustaining-
containership (NSSC) was converted to carry seasheds was for
the Display Determination '89 exercise directed by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. These converted ships were intended to
improve the sequence of arrivals for forces deploying to
their theaters of operation. The sequence of arrivals is
also called the closure profile.
The Department of Defense conducted the exercise
to test the use of commercial sealift assets to rapidly
deploy forces overseas to areas of conflict. The assets
were previously thought to be inappropriate for movement of
combat units.
Exercise Display Determination '89 demonstrated the
military usefulness of containerships. The exercise
proved that containerships can enhance the rapid
deployment of combat units to overseas theaters and
improve force closure. (Translog, 1990)
Table 4 shows the nominal loading and unloading
times for various ship types. (MTMCTEA PAMPHLET 700-2,
1989) Using seasheds, flatracks, and containers, military
shippers can modify and load a containership in four to six
days. Deployment time is even quicker when only flatracks
and containers are used because the ship requires no
modification.
Discharge times vary depending on the policy
regarding the procedure to retrograde containers and
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flatracks and the type of cranes available. Discharging a
containership in a port with modern containership handling
equipment can take as few as one to three days.
Table 4 : SHIP LOADING AND UNLOADING TI3R8
Type of Ship Avg. Avg. Avg Load Unload





Slow SS _2/ 15,867 51,485 17.3 4 4
Fast SS 15,341 36,951 20.7 5 5
Breakbulk
Slow 15,053 59,149 17.7 4 4
Fast 18,891 18,891 20.4 4 4
Container
Slow SS 18,684 0 17.0 1 1
Fast SS 24,702 0 20.0 2 2
Slow NSS- 3/ 24,259 0 17.1 1 1
Fast NSS 38,957 0 22.0 1 1
RORO/Container
Fast SS 38,209 131,801 22.0 2 2
Fast NSS 19,300 201,600 25 1 1
Roll-on/Roll-off
Slow SS 26,758 115,157 18.0 1 1
Fast SS 38,154 164,466 23.3 1 1
Fast NSS 19,300 161,960 28 1 1
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Table 4 (Continued): SHIP LOADING AND UNLOADING TIBMS
Note: The ship data are for US-flag and Active Ready
Reserve Force Vessels.
-'/Includes container capacities except for
containerships.
-2/SS denotes self sustaining. (Ship can discharge in
stream with its own gear.)
-
3 /NSS denote non-self sustaining.(Ship is
loaded/discharged by shore equipment.)
Source: MTMCTEA Pam 700 - 2 Logistics Handbook for
Strategic Mobility Planning. August 1989
b. Seaaheda Currently Available for Deployment
During fiscal year 1993 the status of pre-
installed seasheds include Military Sealift Command's
(MSC's) Fast Sealift Ships (FSSs) and Auxiliary Craneships
(TACs). All of the FSSs are equipped-with thirty-five foot
seasheds.
Forty-foot seasheds are installed in the MSC's
craneships (TACs). Table 5 contains data about MSC's
preboarded seasheds, container cargo stowage adapters, and
flatracks associated with those ships. As indicated in
Table 5, seasheds were not utilized for Team Spirit '93
exercises. Consequently, seashed cost and performance data
is not available from that exercise. Therefore, for the
purpose of this thesis research, employment data will be
collected from the most recent employments of seasheds,
Desert Sortie and Display Determination '89.
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Table 5: MILITARY SIALIFT COMMAND CRANSHIPS WITH FORTY FOOT
SZASHZDB INSTALLID




KEYSTONE STATE 3 0 0
(T-ACS 1)
GEM STATE 10 0 0
(T-ACS 2)
GRAND CANYON 10 0 0
STATE (T-ACS 3)
GOPHER STATE 12 6 0
(T-ACS 4)
FLICKER TAIL 13 6 11
STATE (T-ACS 5)
CORNHUSKER STATE 12 6 0
(T-ACS 6)
DIAMOND STATE 13 4 4
(T-ACS 7)
EQUALITY STATE 12 3 0
(T-ACS 8)
GREEN MOUNTAIN 2 1 0
STATE (T-ACS 9)
ZIZRCISI TIAM 0 0 162
SPIRIT '93
ITOTAL 87 26 177
Source: Military Sealift Command Headquarters, Code N9
46
c. U.S. Flagged ContainerahIpa Available For
Conversion
There are several classes of commercial
containerships which can be modified to carry outsized cargo
using seasheds. Those vessels have a variety of
configurations and a range of capabilities that makes each
class unique. Appendix B contains the containership
conversion cost per vessel and the number cf seasheds and
containership cargo stowage adapters (CCSAs) per vessel
developed in a contracted study performed by McCaffery and
Whitner, Inc. (McCaffery and Whitner, 1992). The study was
performed for MARAD to estimate the cost of converting any
of the containerships and container/breakbulk ships by
installing seasheds.
The study provided estimates based on
assumptions of 1990 dollars and used answers from
questionnaires sent to U.S. shipyards that would be eligible
to perform the conversions. The results of their study
listed the ships that could be converted, the number of
seasheds and CCSAs each ship was capable of carrying, and
the estimated cost to convert each ship. The study provided
drawings of how the seashed and CCSAs would be fitted in
each ship as presented in Appendix A. It concluded with a
list of recommended ships best suited for the conversions.
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This thesis has embellished those results by
computing the total square footage provided per vessel as
listed in Appendix B, graphing the results as shown in
Figure 6, and computing the cost per square foot for each
vessel. The computations in Appendix B were made by
entering the number of seasheds and CCSAs per ship into a
spreadsheet and summing the square feet provided
(approximately 800 square feet per seashed or CCSA) in each
set of seasheds and ccsas. The conversion cost per square
foot is determine by dividing the estimated cost by the
number of square feet available with the seasheds and CCSAs
installed. This information will also be useful in Chapter
V, where costs are analyzed in the decision support model.
The recommendations made by the McCaffery and
Whitner study suggest a list of four combinations of vessel
classes which could be modified and indicates their two most
preferred options. Their recommendations included
converting as follows:
* Option 1: Full conversion of all standard vessels
except Economy Class. This option converts all seasheds
convertible holds on the following classes: C5-S73B, C6-
M146A, C6-M-F147A, C6-S69C(C), C6-S85A, C6-S85B, C7-
M88A, C7-S-68C,D,E, C7-S88A, C9-M132B, C9-M-FI48A(J),
C9-M-FI50A, C9-M-Fl51A, SL-D9, SL-D9(C), SL-D9(J).
- Option 2: Full conversion of all standard vessels and
33% conversion of the Economy Classes. This option
converts all seashed convertible holds in the following
classes: C5-S73B, C6-M146A, C6-M-F147A, C6-S69C(C), C6-
S85A, C6-S85B, C7-M88A, C7-S-68C.D,E, C7-S88A, C9-M132B,
C9-M-F148A(J), C9-M-FI50A, C9-M-Fl51A, SL-D9, SL-D9(C),
SL-D9(J). This option fully converts 33% of the seashed
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convertible holds of the C9-M-Fl41A class (Economy
Class). (McCaffery and Whitner, 1992)
Total Square Footage CSeashedsD
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Figure 6 Square Footage Available from U.S.-flag
Containerships with Seasheds Installed
The total square feet offered by each vessel is
summarized in Figure 6. Figure 6 shows the number of square
feet that various groups of vessels in Appendix B can carry
and also shows the total number of vessels which can carry
the square footage in that range. Appendix B shows that the
economy class can carry substantially more cargo using
seasheds than the other classes; these ships carry in the
range of 112,000 square feet. A composite of the other
vessels after conversion shows a range of 30,000 to 40,000
square feet.
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d. 2ypea of Units hat Could Zuploy Seasheda
Which units should employ seasheds in their
deployment? Any units selected by USTRANSCOM to have their
unit equipment transported by seasheds would want their
equipment to arrive in theater intact to the greatest extent
possible. Unit commanders place high value on unit
integrity. They believe that containerization would mean
splitting up their equipment into hundreds of container
boxes for transport on multiple ships. As a result, they
favor roll-on/roll-off over container vessels so they can
consolidate their cargo and unit equipment on as few ships
as possible, thus maintaining unit integrity. (Matthews and
Holt, 1992) Table 6 presents estimates for several types of
Army units which could be selected for transport by
containerships enhanced with seasheds or flatracks.
Table 6 shows that military flatracks and
seasheds can carry more than 90% of each unit type including
Air Assault, Airborne, Air Cavalry, Armored Divisions, Light
Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Divisions. By comparison,
containers and privately owned commercial flatracks are
significantly less able to carry much of the divisions'
equipment. For example, Light Infantry divisions can ship
40 to 48 percent of its unit equipment by containership, but
by using seasheds or heavy duty flatracks they could ship 97
percent of their unit equipment.
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Table 6: PERCENT ARMY TYPE DIVISIONS DEPLOYABLE VIA
CONTAINERSHIPS
Unmodified Modified
Type Division Containers Flatracks
Seasheds
20-Ft 40-Ft Private Heavy -
I I owned Duty
Air Assault 31 38 87 94 91
Division
Airborne 39 49 93 97 96
Division
Air Cavalry 18 19 64 95 91
Regiment
Armored 8 8 50 98 94
Division
Light 40 48 91 97 97
Infantry
Division
Infantry 9 9 51 99 97
Division
(Mechanized)
Source: MTMCTEA Study OA 88-5c-18 Analysis of
Containerization on Unit StrateQic Deployment, November
1988 as cited in MTMCTEA 1-.n 700-2, August 1989.
B. TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS
To survive, U.S.-flag commercial shipping must earn
revenue. Earning revenue means moving cargo, and moving
cargo means not waiting for a DOD call-up. Thus, short
of a declaration of a national emergency, U.S.-flag
ships do not get called into government service.
(Ackley, 1992)
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1. The Transportation Problems Associated with Soasheds
Commercial U.S.-flag liner trade is too competitive
for liner operators to take a ship off of its trade route to
haul non-routine cargo on a one-time charter basis.
Seasheds are not commercially employed and would require a
charter hire to accomplish installations of seasheds for a
one-time charter for DOD. Such an arrangement would disrupt
the liner's scheduled trade route, and in most cases where
the carrier has no other ship to replace the liner, it can
result in the permanent loss of the trade route to
competitors.
The most persistent problem that has hindered the
use of seasheds is the high cost estimates for chartering
ships as well as the modification costs. These cost
estimates for charter ships have not been substantiated by
previous research due to the lack of actual usage of
seasheds.
a. Factors Which Hinder Seashed Elployment
According to a USTRANSCOM research point paper
which discusses plans to employ seasheds during Desert Storm
redeployment, several factors hinder employing seasheds for
deploying units. The following reasons are among those
-ited:
Installation usually requires cell guide strengthening
and modifications, a 3-day, 24 hour-a-day operation, or
5 to 6 days at a normal pace. Design and material lead
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time may also be additive considerations. Only a very
few of the U.S. flag containerships have been modified
to accept seasheds.
" Seasheds are located only at Bayonne, New Jersey;
Charleston, South Carolina; and Port Hueneme, California
and are normally moved by barge to the physical on-load
site. This either limits the overall throughput
capability to that of local shipyards or adds ship
repositioning to the on-load time if an out-of-area
industrial facility performs modifications.
"* U.S. flag liner operators have been generally unwilling
to remove containerships from very competitive trade
routes for the time necessary to make cell guide
modifications due to fear of permanent loss of container
trade to the foreign flag competitors.
"* Government has been unable to guarantee extended charter
time and sufficient cargo to recompense operators for
their lost container trade. (West, 1990)
Considering the cost of ship modifications and
charter for containerships, use of seasheds is expected to
be more expensive than chartering RO/ROs or breakbulk
vessels to move unit equipment. (West, 1991) However, if
the supply of RO/RO and breakbulk vessels was exhausted and
only containerships could be used to carry military cargo,
there would be no sealift alternative to using seasheds.
The only choice would be simply when to ship the materials
to the theater of operation.
The estimated cost for containership conversion
and a single charter, reported to USTRANSCOM, for ships
enhanced with seasheds is $187 per square foot, and the
estimated cost for shipping when using flatracks is $44 per
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square foot. (West, 1991) Further analysis of this cost
breakdown is presented in this and the following chapters.
b. Solutiona Tat Neoe Projpo•ed
To overcome hindrances to seashed employment, on
February 22, 1991, USTRANSCOM raised the possibility to DOD
that the U.S. may need to rely on U.S. flag carriers and
organic assets to a greater extent in future operations.
Based on that assumption, USTRANSCOM proposed using seasheds
and flatracks for redeployment during Desert Storm.
In a joint meeting on seashed usage between
USTRANSCOM and Special Middle East Sealift Agreement (SMESA)
carriers on February 21, 1991, the carriers' reaction was
that large, bulky unit equipment should be transported on
RO/ROs. They further recommended that containerization be
used instead of seasheds in order to maximize efficiency.
They also stated that flatracks are preferable to seasheds.
They pointed to the large cubic capacity consumed by
seasheds as the cause of its high expense and inefficiency.
(COMSC Message 222259Z February 1991)
Since there had been no previous operational
experience using seasheds (only one practice experience in
Display Determination '89), USTRANSCOM decided to explore
the pros and cons by employing them in an actual
redeployment: Desert Sortie.
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During May, 1991, a commercial breakbulk
container vessel, SS Mallory Lykes, was outfitted with three
CCSAs and six seasheds in Bayonne, New Jersey. The Mallory
Lykes, a self-sustaining containership, was evaluated during
Operation Desert Sortie by Military Sealift Command for
future utilization of seasheds and flatrack systems in
accomplishing unit movement. It was tested to demonstrate
the use of seasheds and flatracks.
C. RESULTS OF DESERT SORTZI
1. Actual Performance
The test of seashed performance under actual working
operations demonstrated the use of containerships using
seasheds and flatracks for unit movement. Cargo that was
not otherwise containerizable was carried with seashed
enhancements. The results were summarized and reported by
Commander, Military Sealift Command, South West Asia
(COMSCSWA, 1991). The highlights of the report are discussed
next.
a. Cargo Handling Successe&
The total cargo loaded on Mallory Lykes in one
load was 3,361 pieces occupying 40,440 square feet (8,309.93
M/T). Loading required 61 hours of cargo handling time.
Seasheds and flatracks used were in an excellent state of
preservation, and the cranes and topside equipment worked
well with them. The Mallory Lykes carried more flatracks
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than required, and the preparation and installation of those
flatracks may have caused up to five hours of delay before
cargo handling.
Figure 7 shows the performance of Mallory Lykes
with the seasheds installed, loading 40,440 square feet as
compared with similar breakbulk ships participating in
Operation Desert Sortie. Among the ships participating, the
Cape Bover's performance data is considered an outlier. The
Cape Bover utilized tight stowage and enhanced its loading
capacity through secondary loading, where cargo is stuffed
inside of other cargo to exceed the square footage capacity
of the vessel.
Mallory Lykes Loading
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Figur~e 7
Source: Military Sealift Command Code (N9)
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In comparison with ten other breakbulk ships
with similar capacities, Mallory Lykes was the fastest
loading ship per hour using the seasheds and CCSAs
installed. Figure 8 shows the hourly loading rates of the
ships as well as the average and standard deviation of
loading rates per hour. Mallory Lykes was more than a
standard deviation faster than the average vessel in the
group. It loaded 663 square feet per hour, while the
average loading rate was 468 feet per hour. However, this
can be explained in part by the different cargo type
characteristics.
Mallory Lykes Loading
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Figur.e 8
Source: Military Sealift Command Code (N9)
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Figure 9 shows the percentages of each vessel's
square footage utilized for stowage. The average space
utilization was 94.64%. However, the type of cargo carried
by seasheds on Mallory Lykes had an inherently poor stowage
factor.
Cape Bover's percentage of square feet loaded
creates an anomaly because it was counted as 140 percent.
That causes the mean percentage of square feet loaded to be
higher than it would be if all the ships counted only square
footage of cargo loaded on their decks with the maximum
percentage of square footage available equal to one-hundred
percent. Excluding the Cape Bover, a more realistic
extimate of the square foot utilization drops to 85 percent
(from 94.64 percent). The Mallory Lykes square foot
utilization was 80.89 percent.
The Mallory Lykes had 50,000 square feet
available and loaded 40,444 square feet. Commander,
Military Sealift Command, South West Asia (COMSCSWA)
expected the broken stowage factor for the cargo to be 35 to
40%. Broken stowage is the amount of square footage which
is unusable in the container or seashed due the bulkiness of
the cargo. It is computed as I- (stored amount)/(measured
cargo storage space). Therefore, the broken stowage factor
experienced by Mallory Lykes of 19.1 percent (1- 80.89%) was
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better than expected for the track and wheeled vehicles it
carried.
Mallory Lykes Loading
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Figure 9 Source: Military Sealift Command Code (N9)
b. Cargo Handling Problema
Prior to Operation Desert Sortie, the
significant perceived problems in handling cargoes using
seasheds had not been identified in actual operations but
had been noted in NAVSEA publications based on tests and
evaluations of seasheds. Desert Sortie provided MSC with
the unique opportunity to thoroughly document actual
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performance including near-accidental situations and
potential problems. A list of lessons learned from COMSCSWA
shows the most significant general findings from the
operation:
" The configuration of seasheds on Mallory Lykes presented
a safety hazard to personnel steadying cargo from below.
If a load should fall, personnel working in the hold
would have little room to get out of its way.
"* The 30* lip around the seashed deck prevented vehicles
from being placed directly on their final location
because the slings on larger vehicles would catch under
the lip and no amount of steadying could place the load
on its intended spot.
"* Loading would occasionally be delayed while a driver was
located to maneuver the vehicle into place under its own
power.
"* More than once the vehicle struck the side of the
seashed.
"* Only 80.89% of Mallory Lykes' available stowage was
used.
"* Manpower shortages for crane operators and truck drivers
caused other delays. (COMSCSWA, 1991)
2. Other Lessons Learned from Actual Zmployment of
Seasheds
Two of the recommendations regarding future seashed
employment from Commander, Military Sealift Command, South
West Asia, (COMSCSWA) were to:
• Identify, prior to deployment, units which are capable
of being moved entirely on a container ship using
containers, seasheds, and flatracks. Equip units thus
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identified with required containers before they are
moved to a staging area.
Use a larger container ship with more seashed and
flatrack capability for future tests. That will allow
more flexibility in unit selection and in cargo
operations. (COMSCWA, 1991)
The latter recommendation is consistent with the
McCaffery and Whitener, Inc., consultant group's findings in
August of 1992. That study is further analyzed in the next
chapter.
3. Cost of Mallory Lykes Charter
The Mallory Lykes charter hire per diem was $24,000
per day for each time chartered trip. A time charter per
diem does not include the cost of fuel, port charges, or
canal tolls which are expenses directly reimbursed by the
Government. The estimated total cost for each trip was
approximately $1,600,000, inclusive of fuel, port charges
and canal tolls. (Fischer Interview, 1993) This estimate of
total cost makes the estimated cost per square foot
chartered approximately $39.60 per square foot
($1,600,000/40,440 sqft) instead of the previously estimated
$187 per square foot reported to USTRANSCOM prior to Desert
Sortie.
The next chapter uses the data presented in this
chapter to analyze the cost and time requirements that have
become the strategic issues involving whether or not to
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employ seasheds for deployments. A decision support model
is presented to examine the time and cost factors involved.
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V. SlASHED DATA ANALYSIS
A. PURPOSE
This chapter analyzes the time requirements and cost
estimates involved in determining the military usefulness of
seasheds for a particular exercise or deployment. It uses a
computerized decision support model to aid in simulating
seashed employment activities. The intent of the analysis
is to examine whether there would be a significant time
saving benefit to the government if the U. S. flagged fleet
enhances its military usefulness with pre-boarded seasheds.
A second issue is whether the costs (or savings) involved
in pre-boarded seasheds are worth the benefits.
To examine the seasheds' expected performance given the
time and budget constraints, this thesis presents a model of
sequential activities required to employ seasheds and then
utilizes the data discussed in previous chapters to project
the completion time and expected cost of using seasheds.
The method that is used for this analysis is a network
analysis tool known a the critical path method (CPM), which
is a technique used to plan, schedule, and control projects
through their completion. CPM is a formal approach to
project management that aids in decisions involving projects
that are complex, non-repetitive, unique and can be modeled
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as a network to illustrate interrelationships of activities
required in the project. CPM is more fully explained later
in this chapter's discussion of the critical path and cost
crashing techniques.
B. D3LI3ZRATZ PLANNING OPPORTUNITIZS TO EMPLOY SZASHKDS
Planning for minimizing the impact of a sealift
shortfall requires military planners to adopt some
assumptions about the size and location of a sealift
requirement. When planning for the use of seasheds in a
contingency that requires a large scale movement of outsize
equipment, it would be helpful to simulate conditions in an
operation such as a logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS)
exercise.
A coordinated exercise such as Display Determination '89
(DD-89), which has performance evaluations, time
requirements, and cost data, can help in planning for future
exercises or crisis actions. In fact, the DD-89 After
Action Report (Military Traffic Management Commnand,
Transportation Engineering Agency, 1990) and the MSC cost
estimates for DD-89 (Military Sealift Command Atlantic,
1989) are used as a basis for cost estimates in the model
presented in this chapter when more current cost data from
Desert Sortie is not available.
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1. Steps Required to amploy Seasheds
Before USTRANSCOM planners will consider employing
seasheds, there must be a sealift shortfall identified.
This means unit equipment is required in the deployment
theater by a required delivery date (RDD) and it would not
be delivered without employing seasheds. (Paradise, 1992)
Many conditional decisions are required once it is
determined that seasheds must be employed to meet a RDD or
lift an additional amount of outsize cargo after a shortfall
occurs. These decisions deal with selecting the unit which
will be carried, selecting the best ship from the ones
available, and identifying manpower and equipment needed to
prepare, load, and discharge vessels when needed. Table 7
describes the activities that are required for loading and
discharging a seashed-equipped containership and describes
their precedence relationships with each other.
Some activities are concurrent with others during
their operations which may have different completion times.
There is slack time created by these time differences which
permits predecessor activities to start early, finish early,
start late, or finish late. However, even though some
activities may start before their predecessor activities
finish, they cannot finish before all of their predecessors
are finished.
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D Move vessel to B,C
SPOE-1"
E Strengthen cell D
guides (if not
done previously)
F Transport seasheds E
to loading dock




H Install Seasheds G
I Move unit A
equipment to SPOE
J Load unit H,G,I
equipment
K Movement to POD- 2' J
L Offload K
M Return for the L
next load
I_ _ (activity J) I
-ISPOE is the shipping port of embarkation
-
2
'POD is the port of debarkation
Source: USTRANSCOM Code (J5-AL)
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Military planners must determine the scheduling of
these activities to support a deployment of unit equipment
employing seasheds when the contingency requires their use.
These decisions can become costly when there are avoidable
delays or requirements that are not given proper
consideration during the deployment planning phase.
The current status of ships available to install
seasheds from the list appearing in Appendix B indicates
that only one of them has been modified with strengthened
cell guides to accommodate seashed installation; Sealand
Consumer was the vessel actually employed in DD-89. At $16
per square foot, its conversion cost is the lowest of all
the estimates and it is less than one-third of the $57
estimated cost of the Sealand Producer, a vessel in the same
class.
Every other vessel listed will require a full
conversion and will incur conversion costs in addition to
the chartering costs. These conversion costs are for a one
time basis, and if the seashed installation is used
repeatedly, the conversion cost per charter is incrementally
decreased with each voyage. (Corkrey, 1993) The conversion
costs specified in Appendix B may be three to four times too
high, given the disparity between the actual experience with
Sealand Consumer and the estimates for Sealand Producer.
Estimates in the model presented in the next section are
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based on actual costs from Sealand Consumer in DD-89 and
Mallory Lykes during Desert Sortie whenever possible.
2. A Planning Approach Using a Decision Support Model
When deployment steps are carefully planned by
military planners, the task of scheduling each activity in
the proper sequence is more certain once the predecessor
activities have been identified and their completion times
are estimated. However, real logistics demands require
flexibility in the times to meet required due dates (RDDs)
or requisitions for sealift square footage in the deployment
theater. To achieve this flexibility, military planners
must make judicious decisions on whether the RDD can be met
using seasheds and make precise estimates of what the cost
would be with changing deadlines.
These decisions can be disastrous if they are based
on erroneous estimates. But if accurate information is
used, a defensible decision can be supported by a logical
approach and reasonable estimation of the time and costs
involved. The next section presents a proposed decisicn
support method for modeling and solving cost and time
requirements when given reasonable estimates for employing
seasheds.
C. MODEL PRESENTATION
By using the list of activities described in Table 7 to
represent the sequential relationship of tasks involved in
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seashed employment, this section establishes a basis for a
time line to aid in estimating the duration of loading and
discharging a containership enhanced with seasheds for
outsize equipment carriage. The activities' relationships
are illustrated with a network diagram in Figure 10 which
will be useful in reorganizing the resources once the
sequence of tasks that take the longest time is identified.
That sequence of tasks is commonly referred to as the
critical path.
The network construction depicts project activities and
their interrelationships graphically, showing their
precedent relationships as listed in Table 7. The network
has two components:
"* Activities are represented by arrows, and labeled
alphabetically. They are tasks that consume time and
resources and incur costs.
"* Events are project milestones, represented by numbered
circles, which occur at a point in time when all the
activities preceding them are finished. They are
connecting nodes where new activities begin.
A dashed line represents dummy activities that are used
in constructing the network to ensure that proper precedence
is maintained and to avoid having two nodes directly
connected by more than one activity. It uses no resources,
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Figure 10 CPM Network for Seashed Employment
1. Model Explanation
CPM is not an optimization technique. It is a
descriptive or predictive tool whose value lies in the
information it provides through identifying the activities
that are critical for on-time completion of the project and
determining completion time. When planners have this
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information they can work toward completing a project on
time and within their budget constraints without gross
discrepancies.
When the decision support model's output results are
generated, the cost per square foot is calculated to
demonstrate how the model may be used to measure the cost
effectiveness of a particular alternative with seasheds.
a. Critical Path Method
CPM was developed in the late 1950s by the Navy
Special Projects Office. (Dennis and Dennis, 1991) It is
commonly used in construction projects where time and cost
estimates can be made with some degree of certainty.
Since all activities are not completed in series
it would be erroneous to simply add up the estimated
duration of each time to calculate the time required to
complete the project. Some activities occur simultaneously
and they are represented on different paths. However, it is
possible to compute the completion time by identifying the
paths and summing up the lengths of their activities to
determine the longest path. That is the critical path.
There are many computer software packages
available with this technique and most programs will
automatically compute the critical path and project
completion times once the activity time data is entered.
The QSB Plus software package was used for this research
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because it has the capability to automatically compute a
cost estimate for a given completion time constraint and
predict the cost of the project if a shorter duration of
time is required. Additionally, the QSB Plus software
package is compatible with the word processing package used
for this thesis.
These features can be useful for the planner in
controlling an activity's slack times and wisely scheduling
activities to keep the project within budget guidelines.
Shortening the duration of a project is known as project
crashing and is discussed next.
b. The Project Crashing Concept
Controlling the completion time of an activity
can be done by controlling the resources used to accomplish
the task. Manpower, equipment, and overtime can be used to
expedite a task. If additional money is spent to shorten a
project duration, it should be done as economically as
possible. A cost analysis which looks at the tradeoffs
between costs and time can aid in a decision which chooses
the specific activities to crash and by how much.
Crashing a project requires sequentially
reducing activities on the critical path in such a way that
it achieves a maximum reduction of time for each dollar that
is spent. The computer application developed for this
thesis does that function automatically. When all of the
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activities' time lengths and costs are summed by the program
it displays the critical path and the total expected cost
for the project. What it actually computes is a
differential in cost and time for each activity when it is
given:
"• Cn: Normal cost - the cost to achieve the task under
normal circumstances, using the resources required to
complete the activity in the normal time.
"* Tn: Normal time - the expected activity time under
normal circumstances.
"• Cn: Crash cost - the cost under expedited or crash
circumstance.
"• Tn: Crash time - the least possible time it can take to
complete an activity.
Cost per unit time may be described in terms of
hours, days, or weeks. For the purposes of this thesis the
unit time will be expressed in days.
The maximum time reduction (tr) is the
difference between normal time and crash time:
tr=Tn-Tc (1)
Crashing cost per unit time for each activity is calculated
as follows:
Crashing cost/time= Cc-Cn (2)
Tn-Tc
Hence, the equation used to calculate crashing cost for an
activity is expressed:
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Crashing cost/time- Cc-02 (3)
tz
The cost crashing technique can be repeated
until there is no slack remaining in the time, and no
further reduction in time can be made by crashing any
activity time. In other instances, a planner may reach a
point where the maximum budget constraint is reached before
the project's shortest crashing time is reached. Either
situation is possible, and the deployment planner's decision
may depend on whether more time is available or more funds
must be spent to meet th, RDD commitment.
For comparison purposes, using the seashed data
presented in this thesis, once the total normal cost is
determined by the program it will be converted into cost per
square foot. Then, cost per square foot will be computed
for the total crashing cost.
c. Model Validation
The criteria for employing seasheds is
established by USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM only considers
employing seasheds when there is no roll-on/roll-off vessel
available, RDD cannot be otherwise achieved, and a shortfall
of unit equipment will occur in the deployment theater as a
consequence of not using seasheds. It has been confirmed by
USTRANSCOM Code (J5-AL) that the list presented in Table 7
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includes the activities that must occur when the decision is
made to employ seasheds. (Paradise, 1993)
D. MODIL APPLICATION WITH SEASHEDS
An input was generated based on the activities in Table
7 and costs estimates for normal times and crash times in
Table 8. Some estimation of costs was required due to
unavailable data. However, actual data was used from
Display Determination '89 exercises and Desert Sortie
operations to the greatest extent possible in an effort to
keep the estimates realistic and conservative.
Input data included cost estimates provided from:
"* Military Sealift Command, Atlantic cost estimate from
iplay Determination '89 (DD-89) loadout;
"* After Action report for DD-89 for March 1990; and
"* Desert Sortie chartering costs and performance data from
Mallory Lykes chartering.
Durations for some of the activities such as G, and H are
based on the time required to install a seashed group, which
include three seasheds and one CCSA as listed in most cases
in Appendix B.
1; Model Assumptions
It is assumed that there is a tradeoff between
project completion time and project costs. However, if an
alternative permits a faster completion time for the same
cost as a slower alternative with the same amount of square
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footage a computerized solution is not needed because the
faster alternative is immediately identifiable as the most
beneficial decision. This resolves any confusion on
situations such as Equation 3, where if tr (= Tn-Tc) equals
zero the equation is not defined, because the most
economical decision is to choose the normal cost if there is
no time reduction when crash time is used. The software
application makes allowance for that situation, too.
Table 8: ESTIMATED NORMAL TIME, CRASH TIME, NORMAL COST,
AND CRASH COST FOR SEASHED EMPLOYMENT
Activity Normal Crash Normal Crash Cost
Time Time Cost
(days) (days)
A 1/4 1/4 $2000 $2000
B 1/2 1/4 $2000 $3000
C 1/2 1/4 $2000 $3000
D 2 1 $800,000 $1,000,000
E 2 0 $60,000 $80,000
F 1 0 $184,000 $220,000
G 1/2 1/2 $1,000 $1,000
H 3 0 $475,000 $550,000
I 3 2 $800,000 $1,000,000
J 3 2 $185,000 $220,000
K 1 1 0 0
L 3 2 $800,000 $1,000,000
M 0 0 0 0
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2. Simulation of Seashed Employment Using Cost Crashing
Technique
Table 8 provides the estimates of normal cost,
normal times, crash cost, and crash times used as input data
for the activities described in Table 7 and Figure 10.
The primary cost and time estimates are based on DD-
89 conversion costs and chartering costs for Sealand
Consumer. The estimate does, however, substitute the time
charter rates from Mallory Lykes chartering during Desert
Sortie as a basis for estimating time charter expenses
($1,600,000 total per charter) in activities D and L because
the estimates are available, more current, and realistically
based on an actual charter expense for normal costs. For
activities D, I, J and L, crash costs and crash time
estimates are arbitrarily estimated as 20% higher for one
day gained due to insufficient data available on manpower
required, overtime, and completion times.
3. Analysis of Cost Crashing Simulation
The purpose of the program application is to examine
whether savings in time and expenses could occur if seasheds
were pre-boarded on vessels. This is simulated by having
the time duration of activities E (cell guide
strengthening), F (transporting of seasheds), and H (seashed
installation) crashed to zero after the normal time and
costs are computed. These three activities were chosen to
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be crashed to zero because they would require zero time if
there were seasheds pre-boarded on the vessel selected for
chartering.
Table 8 costs and times are used as input data for
the simulation of seashed employment. The simulation takes
the data and determines the critical path and normal cost
for that critical path. Then, the time constraints are
shortened to find the cost of the employment with shortened
time constraints by using the computer program's project
crashing technique.
It is important to note that the activities that are
not unique to seasheds' loading and unloading times are set
to zero for their normal time and crash time. These
activities are the ones that involve factors unique to the
ship's speed, the line haul distance, and whether a backhaul
to the POE is required. They are unknown random variables
whose analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. However,
in a real exercise or military contingency these factors
would be known by planners and could be applied with the
model using reasonable estimates. For example, to avoid
mixing in the impact of ship's speed, represented by the
linehaul times from SPOE to POD, activities K and M are set
to zero but they are listed to show their precedence
relationship with the others. Since activity M is
conditional as an option to return for loading more unit
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equipment, it is not included in the computer analysis at
all.
a. ReMults of Computer Analysis
The computerized CPM analysis results of the
network are presented in Appendix C. The normal expected
time to load and discharge a containership by installing a
seashed enhancement is 15 days. The total cost of the
normal seashed employment using the input data in Table 8 is
$3,311,000.
The results display two critical paths for the
network, which means that both paths are equal in duration:
* Critical path # 1 is C- dummy 1 - D-E-F-G-H-J-K-L.
- Critical path # 2 is B-D-E-F-G-H-J-K-L.
These two paths are identical except for the first activity
where one path includes ship identification and the other
includes manpower identification. Both critical paths
includes loading time, unloading times, and merging unit
equipment and vessel at the SPOE. The seashed employment CPM
network computed the cost using the normal times and normal
costs only.
The project crashing technique was applied by
finding the shortest feasible duration that the project
could be completed within. The program computed seven days
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as the shortest time and a new total cost of $3,679,000.
The recommended crash activities were as follows:
"• Crash activity B to Y4 day; incremental cost = $1,000.
"• Crash activity C to V4 day: incremental cost = $1,000.
"* Crash activity E to 0 days: incremental cost = $20,000.
"* Crash activity F to Y day: incremental cost = $27,000.
"* Crash activity H to 0 days: incremental cost = $75,000.
"* Crash activity I to 2% days: incremental cost = $50,000.
"* Crash activity J to 2 days: incremental cost = $35,000.
"• Crash activity L to 2 days: incremental cost = $200,000.
A third critical path appears with the first two
when the crashing technique is performed. Critical path
number three is A-I-J-K-L. These results will be discussed
and interpreted next.
b. Xnterpretation of Results
with the exception of the recommendation for
activity F, all of the recommended crash durations were
used. Activity F could not realistically be crashed to one-
quarter of a day. If the seasheds were pre-boarded there
would be zero time required to transport them to the loading
docks. Therefore, a zero was entered for activity F, and
the resulting total time was computed as seven days by the
program. With those inputs the costs for the seven day
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completion was lowered to $2,779,000 for loading and
unloading pre-boarded seasheds.
Since the input data is based on the costs for a
conversion of Sealand Consumer from Appendix B, the value of
35,200 total square feet is used to convert costs into cost
per square foot. The total cost per square foot based on
the results of the seashed employment CPM network output is
$94 per square foot ($3,311,000/35,200 square feet) and
would require 15 days to complete the project using the
normal time and normal cost input data.
If the crashing network eliminated three-
quarters of a day by crashing activity F the cost per square
foot would have been $104.50 per square foot
($3,679,000/35,200 square feet) and would require seven
days. However, a more realistic approach by planners would
be to shorten activity F to zero and the total cost would be
$78 per square foot ($2,779,000/35,200 square feet) which
would still require seven days for completion. The only
critical path remaining in this crashed network is A-I-J-K-
L.
The reason that the program computed a lower
cost given the shorter time is because the activities and
delays associated with modifying vessels and installing
seasheds are avoided in its network analysis because the
pre-boarding activities would require no time and their
costs would have already been paid.
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When the computerized crashing recommendations
were applied in the model, the total crashed activities cost
more than the normal activities by $368,000 ($3,679,000 -
$3,311,000). The planner would save eight days for that
increased cost.
When the contingency includes pre-boarded
seasheds, the results show that a savings of eight days can
be achieved with an accompanying cost saving of $532,000
($3,311,000 - $2,779,000). This author hastens to add that
the actual conversion costs when pre-boarding seasheds is
not incurred in that computation. In the case of the
Sealand Consumer the cost was ý958,315 as listed in Appendix
B. Therefore, the cost savings with pre-boarded seasheds,
in this case, is not an actual savings but it is a rather
slight increase in cost of $26,315 ($558,315 - $532,000)
above the normal costs without seasheds boarded on the
vessel.
When comparing the crash cost using pre-boarded
seasheds with the crash cost using an unmodified vessel, the
former options costs $900,000 ($3,679,000 - $2,779,000) less
than the latter. Yet, both options require seven days for
completion. These results are interpreted to mean that pre-
boarding seasheds is a more economical decision than
attempting to crash activities on an unmodified vessel. It
is assumed, however, that when meeting the RDD is a high
priority, planners will not be concerned with these
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potential savings opportunities because they have not been
proven and they are not yet an option available to them.
Overall, the results are interpreted to mean
that the time saving of eight days is the significant
benefit of pre-boarding seasheds. As stated before, the
conversion cost per vessel is decreased each time the pre-
boarded seasheds are used, and therefore that cost would be
negated after the seashed enhanced vessel completes a few
charters.
The next chapter summarizes the potential for
seashed employment, discuss its strengths, and weaknesses
and make recommendations regarding further research of
seashed employment.
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VI. S•I•OARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RXCOMOINDATIONS
A. SUBAIRY
The consequence of not employing seasheds for
contingency operations is forfeiture of a range of cost-
effective military options which are currently available.
There is a strong need to ensure that strategic sealift
capability is not lost as a result of a U.S.-flag civilian
fleet which is incompatible with military lift requirements.
As the number of ships considered militarily useful
continues to decline, DOD's exposure to the risk of a
sealift shortfall during a crisis situation will continue to
increase. MARAD's purchase of used RO/RO vessel's for the
RRF is a sure step toward reducing the potential shortfall
in unit equipment carriage capability. However, RO/ROs and
containerships were useful in the Persian Gulf primarily
because of the modern deep-water port facilities available
in Saudi Arabia. The concrete wharves and Saudi ground
transportion systems made ship offloading time minimal and
cargo accumulation on the dock negligible. (Ackley, 1992)
The usefulness of RO/ROs and containerships is not
significantly better than seashed-enhanced containerships in
undeveloped ports.
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Seasheds would be most useful in a contingency, such as
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, with underdeveloped ports
which necessitates logistics-over-the shore (LOTS)
operation. For LOTS operations, ships are required to
offload in-stream from an anchorage at sea, and the unit
equipment is transported ashore by a variety of lift assets
such as causeways, landing craft, or aircushioned landing
craft. Seasheds are considered effective enhancements in
LOTS operations; however, they have not been employed in
exercises or contingencies where they can be tested as
effective LOTS assets.
Maintaining an adequate sealift capability and using the
resources that are available provide military planners the
option to enhance the readiness of sealift assets, reduce
costs, and save time in a crisis situation.
To successfully benefit from the use of enhancement
features, strong support is required from within the
shipping industry. Without considering the views of
shipbuilders/owners/operators, any program initiated for
such an endeavor will fail. (MARAD Report No. 840-
90015, 1990)
Seasheds' ability to increase the sealift capacity of
containerships by including unit equipment cargo carrying
capability has been effectively demonstrated during Display
Determination '89 and Operation Desert Sortie. However, the
addition of seashed enhancement features could have the
impact of either enhancing or detracting from commercial
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shipping operations, depending on the hull type or intended
trade. (MARAD Report No. 840-90015, 1990)
This thesis has presented a decision support model
which, if given accurate cost and time estimates for
activities involved, aids in determining realistic total
costs and time requirements when seasheds ari selected for
hauling unit equipment on containerships. The indications
from the model's simulation, when using the project crashing
technique and critical path method, demonstrate that the
major advantage to DOD, with preboarded seasheds, is the
decreased loading time and unloading time when compared with
the normal time and costs. The simulation's results suggest
that the substantial amount of time saved with preboarded
seasheds would require minimal additional costs in loading
and discharging cargo. Costs were not significantly
increased for the preboarded seashed scenario compared with
the normal operation.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. Merchant Marine's severe decline has had
serious ramifications for national security. According
to General Johnson, during Desert Shield/ Desert Storm
"availability and timeliness of unit equipment capable
ships from both US and worldwide commercial fleets were
not adequate to meet the supported CINC's [Commander in
Chief's) surge requirement." To meet the requirement,
the command used virtually every roll-on/roll-off
(RO/RO) it could find: all 17 in the Ready Reserve Force
(RRF), 47 US flag charter, and 41 foreign flag charter.
Competition among allies exacerbated the problem. For
example, in late November, as USTRANSCOM prepared for
surge deployment, the United Kingdom was contracting for
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22 RO/ROs to move its 4th Mechanized Brigade the Persian
Gulf. It was during that time that the danger in the
situation became most apparent. From late December 1990
to the end of the war, foreign flags carried nearly 40%
of US unit cargo. In General Johnson's words, it
worked okay this time but what if foreign governments
don't go along with operations [next time]? After all,
only the United Kingdom supported our raid on Qadhafi in
1986. France would not let us fly overhead." (Matthew
and Holt, 1992)
Seasheds have military utility but no practical
commercial viability. Economic incentives for containership
operators have not been sufficient to encourage serious
consideration of seashed enhancement installations. The
government takes the risk of placing military planners in
the unenviable position of waiting for a crisis to arise
before choosing the sealift mix, which has tended to include
foreign flag ships before using seashed enhanced U.S.-flag
containerships. Such a policy saves short term costs but
reduces commerce for U.S.-flag operators who would be
chartered for DOD movements and U.S. shipyards that would
perform conversions because time constraints and their cost
are incongruent with current fiscal constraints.
A major hindrance to the use of seasheds for military
contingencies has been the unrealistically high cost
estimates reported to military planners. Seasheds were
authorizer, built, and stockpiled in the 1980's. Their
advantages and disadvantages should be considered based on
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historical performance and non-speculative estimates of
costs.
C. RECOMOENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Even if sealift requirements could be met with
seashed enhancements installed, could containership carriers
still meet worldwide commitments without permanently losing
liner trade routes to foreign competitors?
2. What opportunities exist to acquire aging
containerships for the Ready Reserve Force for the purpose
of preboarding seasheds?
3. If classes of combination container/breakbulk ships
are not profitable for shipowners, would there be a better,
more economical arrangement for the shipowners to preboard
seasheds and carry only breakbulk cargoes on their vessel?
4. What has been the performance of seasheds in
military operations requiring logistics-over-the-shore
(LOTS) and joint-logistics-over-the-shore (JLOTS)
operations?
5. If the decline in militarily useful U.S.-flag fleet
ships continues (from 168 in 1990 to an estimated 35 in the
year 2005), should seasheds be employed more often in the
future as a sealift enhancement feature (SEF)?
6. How can U.S. strategic sealift assets be developed
to provide a sealift capacity large enough to meet military
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Class C6-S-85B Number of Seasheds: 30Number of CCSA: 10
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Number of Seasheds: 30Class C7-S-SSC,DE Number of CCSA: 10
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CLASS SEA COSTPER TOTAL COST PER
VESSEL NAME NUMBER SHEDS CSC's VESSEL SQ. FEET SQ FOOT
AMERICAN RESOLUTE C5-S-739 24 0 1147795 25600 r45
ARGONAUT 24 0 1147795 25600 $45
EXPORT FREEDOM 24 110440 256O0 $43
EXPORT PATRIOT 24 1106440 2600 43
CHESAPEAKE SAY C6-M-146A 24 a 10o17 25600 $43
DELAWARE BAY 24 103175 2= $43
ADABE LYKES OS-M-F147A 1s 6 $01190 10200 $42
CHARLOTTELYKES 16 6 01190 13g00 l42
MARGARET LYKES 18 6 001190 1200 $42
SIELDON LYKES 19 6 801190 1300 $42
PRESIDENT WILSON CS-S-1XAC 5 3 420295 6400 "m
ALMERIA LYKES C6-S-9C0C 12 6 31575 14400 $80
HOWELL LYKES 12 6 6575 14400 $60
MASON LYKES 12 6 661575 14400 8I6
PRESIDENT TAFT 12 6 161575 14400 $60
SEALAND EXPEDITION CS-S-i5A 35 13 1652640 39400 ;43
SEALAND HAWAII 35 13 1652640 31400 843
PRESIDENT JEFFERSON CS-S-@Z 30 10 1447005 3000 $45
PRESIDENT JOHNSON 30 10 144700W5 32000 845
PRESIDENT MADISON 30 10 1447005 32000 $45
PRESIDENT PIERCE 30 10 1447005 32000 ;45
SEALAND ANCHORAGE C7-M-S9A 29 14 1657295 33600 $49
SEALAND TACOMA 20 14 1657295 33600 849
SEL.AND KODIAK 28 14 1657295 33600 $49
HUMACAO C7-S-90C 30 10 1403715 3M000 44
SEALAND CHALLENGER 30 10 1403715 32000 844
MAYAGUEZ C7-S-66D 30 10 1460M0 32000 $46
SEALAND CRUSADER 30 10 1466M0 32000 w46
SEALAND DISCOVERY 30 10 1469000 3M000 w4
CAROLINA C7-S-66E 30 10 1425090 32000 45
GUAYAMA 30 10 1425090 32000 $45
NUE SAN JUAN 30 10 1425090 3M00 $45
SEALAND CONSUMER C7-S-WA 33 11 5315 35200 $16
SEALAND PRODUCER 33 11 2017W95 35200 57
PRESIDENT GRANT CO-S-911E 19 a 963 21600 $45
PRESIDENT HARRISON 19 S 96690 216O0 $45
PRESIDENT HOOVER 19 S 6 21600 $45
PRESIDENT TYLER 19 0 96630 21600 845
SEALAND NAVIGATOR CO-S-9SCW 46 16 2224790 51200 ;43
SEALAID TRADER 40 16 2224790 51200 $43
SEALAND ENTERPRISE 40 16 2224790 51200 $43
SEALAND PACFIC 49 16 2224790 51200 $43
PRESIDENT LINCOLN C0-M-1325 39 15 2172345 43200 80
PRESIDENT MONROE 39 15 2172345 43200 85
PRESIDENT WASHINGTON 39 1s 2172345 43200 850
PRESIDENT EISEP4OWEF CS-M-149.J 23 9 1291715 25600 850
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 23 9 191_ 71S 2600 $50
ehed Cerwerson Costs
"D.WSTMINBAY CO-M-FI41A 105 35 495M 112000 $45
NEDLLOYD HOLLAND 105 35 4199=35 112000 $45
NEDLLO'YD HUDSON 105 35 499= 112000 $45
NKWAK BAY 105 35 49935 112000 $45
RALEIGHSAY 105 35 495951 112000 $45
8SALAN, ACHEVER 105 35 499= 112000 $a
SEALAND ATLANTIC 105 35 49 112000 $45
SIALAt0 COMMITMENT 105 35 499=3 112000 $45
SENA"D PFORMANCE 105 35 4599= 112000 $45
$EALAt QUAC TY 105 35 493= 112000 $45
SEALAID VALUE 105 35 4959=35 112000 $45
PRESIDENT ADAMS CS-M-F1SOA 45 17 242010 49D00 $49
PRESIDENT JACKSON 45 17 2420210 45600 $49
PRESIDENT KENNEDY 45 17 2420210 4600$49
PRESIDENT POLK 45 17 2420210 49600 $49
PRESIDENT TRUMAN 45 17 2420210 49600 $49
PRESIDENTARTIIR C-M-F151A 29 12 199•S0 32000 2
PRESIDENT BUCAtNAN 21 12 1105590 32000
PRESIDENT GAWIELD 3 12 199590 3200S
PRESIDENT HARDING 2 12 110550 3000
SEALAND ADVENTURER SL-06 1 1 1373W0 1600 I$w
$EJ.ALEADER 1 1 137360 1600 w
SEALAND PACER 1 I 137360 100 $06
SEALAND PIONEER 1 1 137310 1600 $16
SEALAND DEVELOPER SL-09 1 27 0 1164M125 2 0 s40
SEALAND FREEDOM 27 9 1164"25 2900 $40
S A PATRIOT 27 1164• 5 000 ;40
SEALAND DEFENDER SL-D9D9C 27 9 11600i M 40
SEALAND ENDURANCE 27 9 1160025 20 $40
SEALAND EXPLORER 27 S 1160025 3=00 $40
SEALAND EXPRESS 27 9 11600I 3 $40
SEALAND INDEPENDENCE 27 9 11600 20 $40
SEALAND INNOVATOR 27 9 1160025 21 W40
SEALAND MARINER 27 9 11e0025 00 $40
SEALAND VOYAGER 27 6 1160 2900 o40
SEA.AND LSERATOR 27 9 le002 2900 $40
TOTAL 3100 1099 $153.19.950 3355400 397.06056
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Apipendix C
CPM Analysis for Seashed Buiployment Page 1
Activity I Activity E2arliest I Latest E~arliest I Latest I Slack
No. Name jlxp.Time Variancel Start I Start I Finish I Finish I LS-ES
---------------- ,-------------------------,--- +  *-------- ..... + ------------------ 1
1. a 1.0.25000 0 10 l+S.7S000I+0.250001.6.O0000I+5.75000
2 b 1+.0.5000 0 10 10 1.0.5000OI.0.SOOOOlCritical
3 c 1+.0.5000 0 10 to I+.0.5000014-.SOOOICritical
4 dummyl to 0 1.O.S50000l.0.500001.0.500001..SOOOOICritical
S d 1+2.00000 0 I.O.S0000I.O.S500001.SOOI2.500001*.OoICritical
6 e 1+2.00000 0 I+2.50000102.50000144.500001+4.SOOOOtCritical
7 f1+1.00000 0 I.4.500001+4.500001.5.500001.5.OOOICritical
8 g l+0.50000 0 1.5.500001.5.500001,6.00000I.6.0000OICritical
9 h 1+3.00000 0 I*6.00000I.6.00000l*9.000001.9.00000ICriticaI
10 dummy2 10 0 IS.sSOOOOl*9.oooool+S.SOOaOt.9.00ooot.3.SOOOO
11 i 1+3.00000 0 1.O.2S5000t.6.00000I.3.2S5000t.9.00000I.5.75000
12 j 1+3.00000 0 1+9.OOOO0t.9.000001+12.O0001+12.OOO0tCritical
13 kc 10 0 I.12.00o0t.12.0000I*12.0000I.12.0000!Critical
14 1 1+3.00000 0 I.12.00001+12.OOOOI.15.0000I+15.0OOOICritical
Expected completion time - 15 days Total cost - $3,311,000
Critical paths for Seashed Employment with completion time - 15 days Total
cost - $3,311,000
CP # 1 c - duzmiyl - di - e - f - g - h - j - k-1
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---------- ----  - -- - - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - --- --
CR4 Analysis for Computerized Crashing Inputs Page 2
-------------------------------------------------- ------------------ I
Activity I Activity laazijestI Latest 13arliestI Latest ISlack
No. Name l~xp.Time Variancel Start I start I Finish I Finish I LS-ES
---------- +--------------+-------------4+-----------------------------+---------------- I
1 a 1+0.25000 0 10 10 1+0.250001.0.25000ICritical
2 b 1+O.25O0(, 0 10 10 1+0.2S0001+0.25000(Critical
3 c 1+0.25000 0 10 10 1+0.250001+0.25OO0lCritical
4 dununyl 10 0 1,0.250001,0.2S0001.0.250001.0.25000ICritical
5 d 1+2.00000 0 1+0.2SO~OOI+.2SO001+2.2SOOOI.2.2SOOOlCritical
6 e 10 0 1+2.2S0001+2.250001+2.2S0001+2.2SOOOICritical
7 f 1+0.25000 0 1+2.250001,2.2S0001+2.S00001.2.SOOOOICriticaI
a g 1+0.50000 0 1+2.S0000I.2.500001+3.000001+3.00000ICritical
9 h 10 0 I.3.000001+3.000001+3.00000l.3.oOOO0lCritical
10 dununy2 10 0 I,2.S0000I.3.000001+2.50000I1-3.000001.0.50O000
11 i 1+2.75000 0 1.0.250001,0.250001.3.000001+3.00000ICritica1
12 j 1+2.00000 0 I.3.000001+3.000001.5.00"001.5.00O00OCritica1
13 k 10 0 1.5.000001,5.000001.5.000001.5.00000ICritica1
14 1 1+2.00000 0 I.5.00000I.5.000001+7.00000I.7.00000ICritical
-------------------------------------------------------------------- I
Expected completion time - 7 Days Total cost - $3,679,000
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Critical paths for try with completion time -7 Days Total cost -$3,679,000
CP #t 1 :c - dumniyl -d -e -f -g -h -j -k - 1
CP It 2 :b- d - e -f -g -h -j -k -1
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CPM Analysis for Crashing Seashed (Pre-Boarded) Page 3
-------------------------------------------------------------------I
Activity I Activity jEarliestI Latest jEarliestj Latest I Slack
No. Name Ijxp.Time Variancel Start I Start I Finish I Finish I LS-IS
----------------------- - -- + - - ---------------------4------------ --------+ -------- I
I a 1+0.25000 0 10 10 1+0.250001+0.25000SCritical
2 b 1+0.25000 0 10 1+0.250001+0.250001+0.500001+0.25000
3 C 1+0.25000 0 0 1+0.250001+0.250001+0.500001+0.25000
4 dummyl 10 0 1+0.250001+0.500001+0.250001+0.500001+0.25000
5 d 1+2.00000 0 1+0.250001+0.500001+2.250001+2.500001+0.25000
6 e 10 0 I+2.250001+2.50000I+2.250001+2.50000I+0.25000
7 f 10 0 1+2.250001+2.500001+2.250001+2.500001+0.25000
a g 1+0.50000 0 1+2.250001+2.500001+2.750001+3.000001+0.25000
9 h 10 0 1+2.750001+3.000001+2.750001+3.000001+0.25000
10 d.umy2 10 0 +2.250001+3.000001+2.250001+3.000001+0.75000
11 i 1+2.75000 0 J+0.250001+0.25000+.3.000001+3.00000ICritical
12 j 1+2.00000 0 j+3.000001+3.00000+5.00000+5.00000ICritical
13 k 10 0 I+5.000001+5.00000o+5.00000o+5.00000oCritical
14 1 1+2.00000 0 1+5.000001+5.00000l77.00000,7.00000ICritical
---------------------------------------------------------------- I
Expected completion time - 7 days Total cost u $2,779,000
-------------------------------------------------------------------I
Critical paths for Crashing Seashed with completion time - 7 days Total cost
- $2,779,000
CP # : a - i - j - k - 1
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